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ABSTRACT
This short paper attempts to clarify some of the issues and provide
suggestions for reforms in the fiscal incentive system.  In particular,
the paper focuses on the Investment Incentive System embodied in
the Omnibus Investment Code.  The paper attempts to provide some
estimate of revenues forgone, specifically from income tax holiday
under different assumptions.  The paper urges that the government
should be aware of these costs, be very choosy in granting
incentives, and should make sure that social benefits from preferred
activities compensate for the costs. Toward this end, the paper pro-
poses a two-tiered approach for reforms—generic and special in-
centives.
* This paper draws heavily from the fiscal incentives study conducted by the author under
  the AGILE project.
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INTRODUCTION
The Philippines has a long history of providing investment
incentives to selected activities. The earliest version, dating as far
back as 1946, granted exemption from all internal revenue taxes (in-
cluding income taxes) for a period of four years to “new and neces-
sary” industries. In the 1950s, incentives in the form of liberal im-
portation of raw materials and intermediate inputs were added. In
the 1960s, identified “basic” industries were offered exemption from
duties on imported equipment. The system of investment incen-
tives was formally institutionalized in 1967 with the enactment of
the Investment Incentives Act.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2
There have been amendments to the Investment Incentives
Act since then, starting with the 1970 Export Incentives Act, Batas
Pambansa 391 (BP 391) in 1983, and culminating with the 1987
Omnibus Investment Code (under the Executive Order, EO 226).
The changes reflected the shift in the focus of objectives: from re-
construction after the war (as reflected in the preference for new,
necessary and basic industries) to export promotion and employ-
ment generation starting in the 1970s. Thus, at least until recently,
the major strategy has been to channel investments to sectors con-
sidered “desirable,” specifically those that have significant impact
on exports and employment.
During the more recent years, the focus seems to have shifted
again somewhat: from attracting investments in selected sectors to
simply “attracting” investments. Not that there is no list of priority
investment (IPP) areas, but that the investment incentive system is
now seen more as a tool to “increase” investments. The objectives
of employment generation and export promotion are still there, but
these appear to be considered more as expected side effects of at-
tracting investments. There is, of course,  nothing wrong with the
objective of increasing the level of investments. The problem is it is
so difficult to determine if indeed the resulting registered invest-
ments are the result of the granting of attractive fiscal incentives.
Moreover, while at a glance such a strategy appears to be less inter-
ventionist, at closer scrutiny, it is not clear if the wide range of ac-
tivities (more so if there is no clear and specific IPP, so that anything
can be eligible for incentives) to choose from gives added benefits.
Indeed, more possibly, this simply leads to higher chances of
committing mistakes and unnecessarily increasing the implied costs
in terms of forgone revenues from the fiscal incentive. Thus, there
are serious implications not readily recognized which need to be
examined. The first concerns the ideal role of fiscal incentives. The
second, which to some is more important, pertains to government
revenues.MEDALLA : Fiscal Incentives Revisited       3
Such a need to revisit the rationale for fiscal incentives has
also become more apparent since conflicting objectives have become
more pronounced: a critical need for more revenues and thus a call
to limit fiscal incentives on the one hand, and a need for more gen-
erous incentives to compete for foreign direct investments on the
other. This short paper is an attempt to clarify some of the issues
and provide some useful suggestions for reforms toward rational-
izing the fiscal incentive system.
The initial step in rationalizing fiscal incentives is to recog-
nize the different purposes they serve. Fiscal incentives are used by
various government agencies to promote their particular objectives.
This has been the main reason for the mounting increases in fiscal
incentives law. (Fiscal incentives are “easy” measures to pass be-
cause costs are hidden and benefits are highlighted. Hence, the ten-
dency to pass more laws granting fiscal incentives for various rea-
sons.) To have a better handle of the discussion, the paper focuses
on fiscal incentives for industrial policy. Hence, fiscal incentives
for other objectives, such as health, environment and agriculture
are best dealt with (and analyzed) separately, preferably under
the purview of the agencies to which they belong. Furthermore,
the paper centers on the investment incentive system embodied in
the omnibus investment code. The ecozones (under PEZA) and
Freeport regimes (Clark and Subic), which are clearly part of in-
dustrial policy, are also excluded in the analysis as these are con-
sidered to be measures to make up for inadequate infrastructure
(and to allow firms to take advantage of existing agglomeration
economies), which fiscal incentives cannot adequately address.1
The same analysis could be used and similar implications derived
in these cases.
The paper will first discuss the economic rationale for the in-
vestment incentive system. This is followed by an analysis of the
1 They also cater mainly to exports and/or foreign investments. As such, there seems to be
greater justification for their existence (e.g., agglomeration economies, foreign investments
and exports promotion) and more reason to presume that benefits accrue (especially if granted
a reasonable occupancy rate of the zones), and consequently less reason to focus the analysis
on.types of fiscal incentives granted. Then the paper attempts to pro-
vide some estimates of revenues forgone, specifically from income
tax holiday, with corresponding insights. Finally, the paper draws
some key implications for reforms of the investment incentive sys-
tem.
ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR INVESTMENT INCENTIVES
As a general rule, government intervenes where the market fails.
The investment incentive system attempts to influence where in-
vestments should go through the granting of fiscal incentives and
the listing of priority areas eligible for these incentives. It is thus
undoubtedly a form of (selective) government intervention. As such,
the same underlying principle applies. There should be some mar-
ket failure that it is trying to address. Indeed, there could be various
market failures and distortions that prevent the optimal allocation
of investment to occur (and as such prevent the industrial sector to
assume its natural role as the leading sector in the development
process). Government intervention is then needed to correct these
market failures and distortions. Ideally, this is the role the invest-
ment incentives system should play.
Basic Principle: Correcting for Market Failures
Not everyone, however, appreciates this role of fiscal incen-
tives (see relevant IMF and World Bank studies). The argument
seems to be that such a “selective intervention” is bound to create
more costs (and failures) than benefits. This is an empirical ques-
tion, which highlights further the need to review and rationalize
the investment incentive system. Furthermore, there is a growing
perception that these fiscal incentives are there more for govern-
ment to correct its own policy-induced distortions, which make in-
vesting here very costly and cumbersome. To some extent, these
concerns are very real and therefore suggestions have been made to
simply do away with circuitous remedies, remove the selective fis-
cal incentive system and make it universal in application. However,
PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 4a big question is, how much more effective this approach is, espe-
cially given the uncertainty over the revenue implications of seri-
ous fiscal difficulties.
The Investment Incentive System as an Industrial Policy Tool
Notwithstanding these questions, what is important to real-
ize is that there is a role for fiscal incentives, if applied judiciously.
The theoretical analysis is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.
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Again, this role arises from the existence of market failures,
e.g., those involving externalities and market distortions. Correct-
ing these market failures would yield a different ranking of returns
to investments from the point of view of society (vs. private rank-
ing) and a higher marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) curve.
Consider, for example, two investment opportunities, Is and Iu. The
dark shaded area in Is indicates the external benefits of the activ-
ity, which private financial analysis ignores, while the dark shaded
area in Iu indicates government subsidies (in whatever form they
are granted to the firm), which private financial analysis consid-
ers. Hence, correcting market failures (the ideal role of the invest-
Figure 1. Marginal efficiency of investment (MEI)
Investment
MEI
I 0 Is Iu
ROI
SMEI
   ment incentive system) for the marginal efficiency of investment
to correctly reflect benefits and costs to society (as opposed to pri-
vate individuals) implies some rearrangement of investment op-
portunities in the figure above. Specifically, in the figure, this means
transferring investment opportunity Is ahead (to the left) and in-
vestment opportunity Iu further away to the right. This yields a
higher MEI curve from the point of view of society, the “social”
marginal efficiency of investments (SMEI). (See Figure 1.) If the
investment incentive system is able to correct market distortions
such that the SMEI curve is also what is faced by the firm (that is,
it also becomes the private marginal efficiency of investments), then
given the level of available investible funds, Io, the total returns to
investments, the area under the curve SMEI is higher than what
would have been without the investment incentive system, curve
PMEI. (See Figure 2.)
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Enough has been said and written on what these cases of
externalities, market failures and distortions are. To summarize,
in the case of market failures and distortions, the primary sources
are found in:a) the trade distortions brought about by differential tar-
iffs and other import controls;
b) minimum wage legislation; and
c) imperfect capital market.
The first two directly affect the prices of tradable goods and
labor, respectively. Their market distortion is clear. The protection-
ist trade policy has inherent bias against exports, and has been a
strong justification for export incentives. The first best policy has
been to implement trade reforms to reduce the bias against exports
and indeed a lot has been done in this area. The wage legislation, on
the other hand, distorts the labor market, raising the cost of labor,
inconsistent with full employment. It continues to be problematic,
given the political nature of the issue.
The third deals more with the fact that access to capital is im-
perfect. Indeed, in certain cases, there may not be a market at all for
certain types of loans and borrowers. This market distortion is one
of the main justifications for build-operate-transfer projects, aside
from the externalities they provide. This leads to the second major
market failure, which could justify the use of fiscal incentives: ex-
ternalities.
Externalities are benefits brought about by the activity of the
firm, which it cannot charge, and costs incurred by the activity, which
it does not pay for. The former is positive externality and the latter,
negative. A foremost example of the latter is pollution, which the
government is unable to check. As justification for fiscal incentives,
what is relevant is the existence of positive externalities. Here are a
few illustrative examples:
a) Exporting activities are generally also found to have posi-
tive externality related to its positive correlation with
overall productivity. This arises from the fact that the
export sector needs always to be aware of and catch up
with the best practice.
b) In the externalities arising from interdependent invest-
ment decisions, certain investments may be socially prof-
MEDALLA : Fiscal Incentives Revisited       7itable as a whole, but individually, firms may not be as
financially profitable and would not invest without criti-
cal mass of investment in the others.
The Metropolitan Railway Transport (MRT) project is a more
specific example. The reduced traffic congestion and lessened air
pollution on EDSA constitute externalities that the firm could not
internally benefit from but are nonetheless real benefits to society.
While it is clear that such cases of market failures and distor-
tions that would justify the role of investment incentives, valid ar-
guments have been raised, mainly with respect to how to identify
such cases, and the effectiveness of such a “selective” approach. In-
deed, if the government is bound to commit more errors than make
wise decisions, then perhaps it is better for it to veer away from
such an approach, or totally abandon the use of fiscal incentives
altogether as implied above. Such a case is illustrated in Figure 1, by
S-MEI, where the intervention of the investment incentives system
makes wrongly rewards undeserving activities, thereby dampen-
ing instead of enhancing the investment opportunities from PMEI
to S-ME.
There are potential losses from an erroneous investment in-
centives system. But done right, potential gains can also be huge.
Imagine if there were extra benefits from an activity that would oth-
erwise have not been encouraged without fiscal incentives (exter-
nal benefits to society not internal to the firm and would thus not be
considered in its investment decision). Imagine, too, if these exter-
nal benefits led to growth elsewhere. In sum, imagine if the invest-
ment incentive system could be an effective industrial policy tool!
Objective: Not to Induce More Investment Per Se
The potential benefits of the fiscal incentive system arise from
directing investment to “desirable” sectors. There is no presump-
tion that benefits accrue because fiscal incentives would encourage
more investments. Indeed, the objective of granting fiscal incentives is
not to induce more investment per se. Increasing the level of savings
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fiscal and monetary policy. This is, of course, only with regard to
domestic investment and temporarily sets aside the question of at-
tracting more foreign investment, which will be discussed later.
 This is probably where a lot of confusion is coming from. The
Board of Investments (BOI) appears to view most, if not all, invest-
ments registered as “additional” investments and, hence, does not
think that there are foregone revenues involved in the granting of
fiscal incentives. Thus BOI’s extremely low estimates of costs of in-
centives for every peso of investment and its predisposition to com-
pete for DFIs using fiscal incentives. On the other hand, this is per-
haps why the IMF and WB studies do not see the need for such
fiscal incentives, which they consider costly and increasingly com-
plex with the enactment of various incentive schemes, without nec-
essarily leading to increased investments.
Again, the objective is not to induce more investment per se. This is
especially true where domestic investment is concerned. The level
of domestic savings and domestic investment is influenced by fiscal
and monetary policy (overall tax rate, corporate income tax and other
general fiscal measures, interest rate, etc.). If ever, the impact of fis-
cal incentives on the level of investment is bound to be marginal.
What this implies is that whatever fiscal incentives are granted, the
tax concessions (i.e., revenue forgone) are real “budgetary” costs to
the government and should be justified by corresponding benefits.
Indeed, a rational government would compare benefits from grant-
ing these fiscal incentives with other government expenditures.
These concerns, however, are brushed aside by a misconception that
fiscal incentives are costless since the investment would not have
happened without them. However, as earlier pointed out, the level
of domestic saving and investment is determined by overall fiscal
and monetary policy, not the fiscal incentive system. As such, the
investment would have been made, perhaps in another activity not
encouraged by the fiscal incentive system (or maybe in the same
activity, even without the fiscal incentive), so that there are real fis-
cal costs in terms of forgone revenues.
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is to increase the level of investment, then it should be done via the
overall fiscal and monetary policy (e.g., lower corporate income tax,
interest rate, net operating loss carry over (NOLCO), etc., which are
universally applicable). Still another set of concerns is how much
additional savings and investments are encouraged and how much
net losses in fiscal revenues are incurred. (Losses in fiscal revenues
from implementing this universal tax incentive might even be more
than offset by gains from increased output and employment that
could arise from increased investment.)  Another strategy, of course,
is to increase the level of investments by attracting direct foreign invest-
ments.
The Role of Fiscal Incentives for Foreign Investment
The analysis above disregards the question of attracting for-
eign investment through fiscal incentives. Indeed, new foreign invest-
ment represents a net increase in available savings which would lead to
higher output and growth. Policy pronouncements regarding the need
for fiscal incentives to be competitive with other countries are not
entirely surprising. The expectation is that competitive fiscal incen-
tives could be used to raise total investment by attracting foreign
investors (Figure 3, from I0 to I1). If such is the case, the benefits are
clear (see the shaded area), as illustrated in the figure.
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Figure 3. MEI with additional foreign direct investmentsYet the effectiveness of attracting foreign investments through
fiscal incentives has been questioned. Studies suggest that the fiscal
incentive system is not a very important factor in a firm’s decision
to locate in a certain country. (See, for example, Aldaba (1996) in
Catching up with Asia’s Tigers.)
Nonetheless, there are other advantages that could be derived
from foreign direct investments that could be considered, aside from
“additional savings.” One pertains to those arising from its direct
linkage with the world market. This means greater market access in
both output and input, and learning from its expertise in dealing
with these markets. Another advantage could be technology trans-
fer. How important these advantages might be depends, of course,
on the nature of the investment and, possibly, on conditions im-
posed by the host government.
The question is, do these advantages of foreign investment
suggest that a premium should be attached to foreign investment,
which could take the form of more generous fiscal incentives?  There
are a number of reasons, however, why this might not be feasible
nor desirable. One of these is that offering more attractive incen-
tives to foreigners than to Filipinos would be politically unaccept-
able. What would this imply if the nature and level of incentives
chosen leaves the Philippines short of attracting the optimum flow?
It is important to remember that there are other ways to com-
pete for foreign capital. A good overall climate for investment, both
domestic and foreign, and an expectation of stability and consis-
tency in the economic policy regime can more important than tax
exemptions and credits, particularly in attracting the kinds of in-
vestments that would be desirable and lasting. Studies show (Aldaba
1996) that a healthy overall economic activity is a more important
determinant of direct foreign investments.
FORMS OF FISCAL INCENTIVES GRANTED
The income tax holiday (ITH) and the tax-free importation of
capital equipment are the key incentives in the present Omnibus
MEDALLA : Fiscal Incentives Revisited       11Investment Code. (See Box 1 for a more complete list of incentives
provided under EO 226.) These are uniform for exporters and
nonexporters alike. The elimination of the openly pro-export in-
centives (present in the previous code) was said to have been done
to avoid questions related to the GATT-WTO provision on prohib-
ited export subsidy. The ITH is also claimed to be easier to admin-
ister, aside from being more attractive to investors.
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Income Tax Holiday (ITH)
¾ New projects with pioneer status for six (6) years
¾ New projects with a non-pioneer status for four (4) years
¾ Expansion projects for three (3) years
¾ New or expansion projects in less developed areas for six (6) years
¾ Modernization projects for three (3) years
Exemption from Taxes and Duties on Imported Spare Parts
Exemption from Wharfage dues and Export Tax, Duty, Import and Fees
Tax Exemption on Breeding Stocks and Genetic Materials
Tax Credits
¾ Tax credit on tax/duty portion of domestic breeding stocks and genetic
material
¾ Tax credit on raw materials and supplies
Additional Deductions from Taxable Income
¾ Additional deduction for labor expense
¾ Additional deduction for necessary and major infrastructure works]
Non-fiscal Incentives
¾ Employment of foreign nationals
¾ Simplification of customs procedures
¾ Importation of consigned equipment for a period of 10 years
¾ The privilege to operate a bonded manufacturing/trading warehouse
Box 1. Incentives granted by the Board of Investments under EO 226MEDALLA : Fiscal Incentives Revisited       13
These forms of incentives, on the other hand, are less neutral
with respect to the choice between labor-intensive and capital-in-
tensive industries and techniques of production. Duty-free impor-
tation of capital (especially where there is a premium on foreign
exchange, i.e., society values foreign exchange more than its official
rate) artificially cheapens capital. Also, the income tax holiday re-
duces the user cost of capital and encourages substitution of capital
for labor.
Other possible types of fiscal incentives could be granted in-
stead of the income tax holiday (ITH). For example, the fiscal incen-
tive granted under BP 391 is in the form of tax credit equivalent to
10 percent of local content for exports and  a tax credit equivalent to
a percentage of value-added for domestic producers (10 percent for
pioneer and 5 percent for nonpioneer). Such preference for ex-
ports and local content, however, could no longer apply to the
GATT-WTO. The tax credit based on value-added, however, is still
an option. It is factor-neutral, in contrast with the ITH. The ques-
tion is the ease and cost of administration (and possibly its attrac-
tiveness to investors). Another type of fiscal incentive being con-
sidered is a tax credit equivalent to the personal income tax with-
held. (These tax credits are all to be credited against corporate in-
come tax due.) This last incentive is obviously biased for labor,
which, given the premium placed by the government on employ-
ment, is not undesirable. However, a question could also be raised
regarding its attractiveness. It is also unclear as to how easy or
costly it is to administer.
Whatever the type of incentive used, fiscal incentives are real
costs. The next section attempts to deal with this issue.
ESTIMATING THE COST OF FISCAL INCENTIVES
The bottom line is: fiscal incentives are not costless. They are for-
gone revenues. If we accept the fact that a lot of these investments
would have been invested anyway (maybe to a different set of ac-
tivities in the absence of fiscal incentives), then these costs are very
real.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 14
Fiscal Incentives Are Real Costs
The problem is that these costs are hidden, there being no
outright payments involved. This makes it difficult to estimate, es-
pecially considering that there are no robust data on investments in
terms of how much of these are registered with the BOI and how
these investments are actually performing. Nonetheless an attempt
is made here to at least come up with ballpark figures to give us
some idea (however rough) about what we are actually “spending”
by granting such incentives, at least for the ITH.2 In the process,
some bold assumptions would be made, possibly with clear indica-
tions of the direction of bias involved. (Perhaps also the errors in-
volved in the simplification would cancel each other out.)
Four sets of assumptions are made which would yield: (1) a
high estimate of forgone revenues from ITH, (2) an intermediate
estimate, (3) a low estimate (not necessarily a lower bound) of for-
gone revenues, and (4) an estimate using the second set of assump-
tions but excluding exports. An effort is made in the last estimate
(4) to segregate exports, where justification for fiscal incentives is
least ambiguous.
A common assumption in all four sets of estimates is that the
return on investment (inclusive of tax) is 12 percent. This is based
on the cut-off rate being used by the Investment Coordination Coun-
cil in its evaluation of projects. This may still be too high, but the
estimates are simply meant to be indicative and adjustments could
be easily made by the reader to suit his own purpose. The higher
the estimate, the higher the forgone revenue implied. (One must
keep in mind, however, why the government should reward un-
profitable activities, unless there are clear externalities involved.)
Another key assumption is the realization rate of project proposals
approved by the BOI. This is assumed to be 75 percent. This seems
like a reasonable first cut although, again, it may be too high. BOI
2 No attempt here is made to estimate revenues forgone from tax- and duty-free importa-
tion of capital, which have expired. Also, the estimate on ITH alone clearly indicates the
magnitude of the cost of fiscal incentives.MEDALLA : Fiscal Incentives Revisited       15
estimates, however, showed that, in the case of incentives grant-
ing tax- and duty-free importation of capital, the actual availment
was around 80 percent of expected from project proposal. This
means that the rate is not unreasonable. Again, however, adjust-
ments could easily be made if the assumed rate is too high (or low).
Finally, the average period of availment is assumed to be five years.
For the high estimate,      , the additional assumption is that
investments would have been made anyway (albeit in different ac-
tivities), so that the forgone revenues are real costs since it only di-
verted investment from an activity which would have otherwise
paid income tax to one which would not. (Of course, the amount of
income would vary, but aggregation would possibly cancel errors
out.) This yields the following formula.
For the intermediate estimate,       , the assumption is that half
of foreign investments are lured by fiscal incentives, so that there
would be no forgone revenues for these investments. Again, adjust-
ments could be made by the reader according to what is considered
a more reasonable figure. The domestic investments are assumed to
be set by the overall fiscal and monetary policy and would have
been made regardless of fiscal incentives. This yields the following
formula.
For the third set of estimates,       ,  the assumption is that all
foreign investments came in because of fiscal incentives, so that there
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an extreme assumption (just as some would consider the assump-
tion that all domestic investments would have been made anyway,
albeit in possibly different activities). Again, these estimates are not
meant to be absolute. This yields the following formula.
The fourth set of estimates,         , is just an attempt to segre-
gate exports, where the justification for fiscal incentive is clearer.
For this purpose, the intermediate assumption is used. The for-
mula is given by the following.
The basic data needed for estimation are equity investments
of BOI-approved projects. The results are summarized in Table 1
(see Annex A for the data set).
The estimates are disturbingly high, from a low of P7.2 billion
to a high of P12.5 billion, considering that the collected revenue from
corporate income tax for year 2000 was only around P44.8 billion. It
is difficult to judge if these estimates really indicate how prevalent
fiscal incentives are because of the absence of actual figures on
investment. Nonetheless, they provide a clear indication that the
I 
L refers to domestic 
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forgone revenues are not minimal. If these costs are not matched
by corresponding benefits to society, then implications are grave.
Indeed, a worst-case scenario is where the wrong set of activities
is promoted by the IPP.
Another observation that needs to be highlighted is the im-
plied subsidy given to exports. This is the difference between
and      . The implied subsidy to exports covered by BOI fiscal
incentives is only  around P500 million. This translates to less than
0.1 percent of the value of exports that could be attributable to
BOI export incentives.
Based on actual availment of incentives, BOI recorded around
P4.2 billion from income tax holiday (source: DOF Report). The
estimates based on above exercise and corresponding assumptions
are much higher—around two to three times as much. While the
estimates are based on assumptions and should be considered more
as simulation results, they nonetheless offer insights about the costs
of fiscal incentives. In particular, some insights could be gleaned
from such a big gap between the availment figure from BOI and the
estimates presented here. The gap could imply any of the follow-
ing: that the realization of investments for approved BOI projects is
much lower than 75 percent (possibly only 50 percent); the rate of
return on investment for these BOI projects is much lower than 12
percent (possibly as low as 6 percent); or, most likely, a combina-
tion of both. In any case, if it were the first, then BOI should try to
improve its followup of the approved cases and determine where
the problems are. If it were the second, then it raises more doubts
on the benefits of the fiscal incentive system. There should be clear
externalities from the investments granted investments, which make
the activity more socially profitable than what the low financial re-
turns imply.
Lack of data about the actual firms’ performance and signifi-
cance limit our findings to this broad interpretation of results. Esti-
mating the revenue forgone is just one side of the equation. The
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even more difficult to estimate. We can only infer some insights
from looking at the type and nature of firms registered with the
BOI.  For more insights, Table 2 lists the top 20 BOI-approved reg-
istered firms in terms of project costs. If these firms are commer-
cially viable, then the magnitude of income tax due should increase
with project cost. Hence, the amount of fiscal incentives (e.g., ITH)
should vary directly with project cost. Indeed, one could perform
the same exercise above (e.g., assume a rate of return and the share
of equity investment in project cost) to provide an estimate of fis-
cal incentives the firm potentially receives. This, however, is not
done in this paper because of the higher likelihood of error since,
for a particular firm, the details matter for specific firms. This is in
contrast with the gross estimate of forgone revenue above, where
the aggregation helps (i.e., by canceling out possible individual
errors). The nature and product of the firm would also indicate
whether the activity yields some externalities (e.g., extra benefits
to society, outside costs and benefits internal to the firm), which
could provide a justification for its eligibility to receive fiscal incen-
tives. For example, the fact that most are domestic investments
suggests that they are not additional investments encouraged by
fiscal incentives.
IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORMS OF THE INVESTMENT
INCENTIVES SYSTEM
Three major points may be deduced from the discussion. One,
fiscal incentives are real costs. Two, these must be compensated by
net benefits to society. Three, errors could mean huge losses (from
the forgone revenue and the net losses from the activity itself). Such
potential losses would occur if the OIC was not performing its role:
correcting market failure. Hence the major objective of reforms
should be to transform BOI and the investment system into one that
would fit better its ideal role in industrial policy—correcting mar-
ket failures and distortions and performing real industrial promo-
tion. Another objective is to set up a system that would minimize
mistakes and the resulting losses. These considerations would notMEDALLA : Fiscal Incentives Revisited       19
Table 2. BOI-approved projects: Top 20 firms, by project cost (2000)
Firm Product Project Cost
Ownership
In P’000 %Filipino
Central Negros Power Corp. Power-generating plant 4447478 100.0
Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. Local exchange telephone 3500000 100.0
Aces Philippines Cellular Global mobile personal 3166300 100.0
Star Infrastructure Southern Tagalog arterial 2217000 100.0
The Purefoods-Hormel C Processed meat 1312756 60.0
Maritime E-Training, Inc. IT-enabled support & knowledge 1083291 100.0
Southern Energy Mobile, Inc. Power transmission 1070004 100.0
Bacnotan Industrial Park Industrial park 1046038 100.0
Sca Hygiene Products Corp. Adult diaper products 954035 59.3
North Wind Power Development Power generating plant 911622 100.0
Goldland Philippines Resort 719201 100.0
Nagtahan Terminals, Inc. Downstream oil industry 668435 100.0
Philtranco Service Enterprises Passenger bus service 602855 100.0
Total Information Management Information technology 516000 99.7
Waste Recovery Company Inc. Waste oil recycling 516000 50.0
Fluor Daniel Inc. Engineering design 490117 100.0
Ami (Philippines), Inc. Electronics 472500 100.0
Pilipinas Kao, Inc. Fatty alcohol 448000 100.0
Cebu Mitsumi, Inc. Integrated circuit module 437794 100.0
Universal Star Petroleum Storage and sourcing of petro 401800 100.0
only help to maximize benefits from tax concessions but also, in
effect, ensure that the system would not pose undue burden to our
fiscal system. Finally, reforms should be based on three basic prin-
ciples:
  a) economic soundness
  b) ease/cost of administration
  c)    transparency.
A crucial step toward fleshing out these considerations is to
limit the number of preferred areas in the IPP using a a clear set of
criteria. This is for two major reasons:
a) By nature, the investment incentive system is selective.
Without IPP, or with numerous areas in the IPP, the
implied industrial policy has no clear focus and will re-
sult in dilution of industrial promotion.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 20
b) This step is necessary to limit the probability of making
mistakes (wrong choice of activities granted incentives).
A short list will make BOI more judicious and enable it
to focus on sectors with extra and real benefits to soci-
ety. In addition, should a mistake be made, losses will
be minimized.
Fiscal incentives are real costs and the wider the IPP areas,
the greater the probability of making mistakes and the higher the
possible welfare losses (from increased tax concessions coupled with
lower benefits to society as a result of those concessions). This is
perhaps the more serious drawback of having no IPP (or having an
indiscriminate IPP). This situation becomes more alarming the more
generous the incentives are.
A supplement to the short list is the introduction of a notional
indicative budget for fiscal incentives. This is short of preparing a
tax expenditure budget that would have to undergo the usual bud-
getary procedure, which becomes less necessary with a short list of
IPP areas. Besides, such a procedure (and would only clutter the
process and make the system even more difficult to administer).
However, the proposed budget could still be a very bold and radi-
cal change that may be difficult to implement. Hence, the “notional”
budget could simply be a system of “fiscal incentives accounting,”
which the BOI should report at least to the Department of Budget
Management (DBM) and the Department of Finance (DOF). Then it
may well evolve into a more typical budgeting system, albeit still
“notional” (involving a predetermined “notion” of how much fis-
cal incentives will be granted for the year at the start of the period.)
Nonetheless, even just a system of fiscal incentives accounting would
already promote transparency and will make the evaluation of the
fiscal incentives system easier.
The proposed step should also include a provision that incen-
tives will be available only for a specified period of time. (This is
different from the time period specified for when an activity is still
included in a list of preferred activities, or more specifically the num-MEDALLA : Fiscal Incentives Revisited       21
ber of years the approved investment could avail itself of incen-
tives.) The definite time period is an extra precaution. It should
not be too long (preferably should not go beyond what other coun-
tries give). Moreover, the definite time period will help ensure that
the activities become viable on their own. It would also result in a
greater number of areas covered over time.
Finally, this necessary step limiting the IPP to a short list would
help reorient the thinking of BOI away from looking at fiscal in-
centives simply as a means to “increase investments.” While a case
could be made in this regard with respect to foreign direct invest-
ments (FDI), such is not the case for domestic savings and invest-
ments (the level of which is determined by the overall fiscal and
monetary policy). Again, if the objective is mainly to increase do-
mestic investments, reforms pertaining to investment incentives
should be made universal (e.g., a universal corporate income tax
reform).
In view of the fact that the BOI does not want an IPP, it has a
number of suggestions on the form of fiscal incentives to be granted.
As emphasized earlier, it is crucial that there be a short list of IPP
(not merely an IPP), supplemented by a system of fiscal incentives
accounting. The form of incentives is secondary. Hence, this is what
the reform of the investment incentive system should first aim for—
a short list of IPP. The challenge is how to do this while addressing
BOI’s concerns.
Proposal: A Two-tiered Approach
To stay within the basic principles and at the same time ad-
dress the concerns of BOI, a compromise proposal is a two-tiered
approach to the investment incentive system. Such a two-tiered
approach incorporates the BOI’s position to do away with the  IPP
at the generic level  but at the same time addresses the need to be
very selective at the second level. This approach is described as fol-
lows:First tier: Generic incentives
a) no IPP, only BOI processing based on comparative advantage;
b) fiscal incentives:
1) Incentive for anti-pollution devices (T/D free import)
2) Double deduction for R&D
3) Tax allowance for LDA locators
4) NOLCO: four years in MM, six years outside (length
negotiable)
5) For exports, access to inputs (including capital equip-
ment) at world prices
 Schemes already existing (e.g., tax and duty draw-
back system, bonded manufacturing warehouse)
 Seek ways to improve availment.
 This is not subject to GATT, since all it offers is
access to inputs at world prices. Many other coun-
tries are practicing this.
Second tier: Special incentives
a) Very selective IPP with stricter rules of selection
1) A short list of at most five sectors at four-digit PSIC level,
or its equivalent, shall be selected for special incentives.
2) In the case of foreign investments falling outside the
short list, direct foreign investments greater than, say,
$20 million, shall be considered for incentives.
b) Fiscal incentives, in addition to generic incentives, composed
of:
1) BOI proposal: ITH with creditable employment taxes or
NOLCO (longer than generic incentives above); there-
after, reduced income tax (six years within Metro Ma-
nila, eight years outside Metro Manila); or DOF proposal:
tax credit equivalent to 10 percent of value-earned (or
value-added)
2) BOI proposal:  tax and duty exemption on imported capi-
tal equipment
PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 223) The short list of IPP shall be prepared by an interagency
committee (Committee) chaired by BOI and composed
of NEDA, DTI, DOST, private sector representatives and
other invited agencies. The final list of IPP shall be ap-
proved by the Board (whose composition is extended to
include DOF and NEDA).
Other provisions of the legislation were as follows:
a) It should require presentation of a fiscal incentives accounting
b) It should require a review of the IPP areas every two (or three)
years and prepare a new short list of IPP areas
c) It subsumes existing fiscal incentive schemes that are clearly
for industrial policy leave other social objectives in the hands
of the appropriate government agency (DENR for environ-
ment, DOH for health, etc).
If BOI (and eventually, Congress) will agree to a two-tiered
approach and a system of fiscal incentives acounting, the form of
fiscal incentive then becomes a secondary concern and concessions
could be made there. This would constitute a big step in reforming
the investment incentive system, the results of which could greatly
benefit the country.
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Annex A. BOI equity investments, new and expansion projects by source and by
market (in million pesos)
Source: Table 12, Selected Statistics on BOI-Approved Projects Under E.O. 226, by Type of Project and by
Sector, Board of Investments.
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